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Abstract—The need for novel smart grid technologies
is often motivated by the need for more resilient power
grids. While the number of technologies that claim
to increase grid resilience is growing, there is a lack
of widely accepted metrics to measure the resilience
of smart grid installations. The design of effective re-
silience metrics is made difficult by the diversity of chal-
lenges and performance measures that a smart grid is
subject to. This work identifies the necessary attributes
for a complete and effective resilience metric and shows
that previous work falls short. It then proposes a
novel approach to measure resilience that focuses on
the complex interdependencies between challenges and
performances in smart grids.
I. Introduction
The motivation for smart grid technologies that is often
put forward is the increase in system resilience that can
be achieved. However, the term resilience is used incon-
sistently throughout recent work. Terms like robustness,
reliability, availability and even security are often used in-
terchangeably with resilience [1]. Recent efforts to explore
the definition of resilience for cyber-physical systems in
general [2] and power grids in particular [1], [3] were made
with the goal to achieve an understanding about resilience
that encompasses all aspects of smart grids. However,
research on descriptive metrics to quantify resilience can-
not keep up with the requirements. New technologies
to increase grid resilience are usually focused on limited
aspects of smart grids. While this is a valid approach to
handle complexity, the metrics used for evaluation are
usually limited in the same way. This is a problem as
research topics keep isolated and a holistic understanding
of resilience in smart grids is prevented.
To overcome this limitation this work identifies seven re-
quirements for a descriptive and holistic resilience metric.
It will further show that initial approaches to resilience
metrics are limited as significant factors such as time
or performance measures are not considered. Based on
these findings a resilience metric framework is presented
and evaluated. The framework is developed to consider
the relationships between various performance measures
and challenges within smart grids and related critical
infrastructures [4]; something that is most often ignored
in existing work. The metric is evaluated in a microgrid
use case which is of high relevance as microgrids gain
popularity as the go-to technology for grid resilience [5],
[3]. The evaluation results show that the metric itself is
easy to apply while the underlying framework can be used
to identify dependencies and guide system improvements.
II. Resilience Metric Requirements
A metric is defined in the ISO 24765 as a quantitative
measure of the degree to which a system, component,
or process possesses a given attribute [6]. Quantifiability
is necessary to enable the comparison of two systems
with respect to their resilience. Comparison needs to be
possible based on measurements (comparison of existing
installations) and based on system models (predictions
during design time).
According to work by Arghandeh et al. [1], the resilience
of a system depends on three potentials. The absorbing
potential (the ability to withstand negative effects), the
recovery potential (the ability to recover nominal perfor-
mance during or after a challenge) and survivability (the
ability to prevent system collapse). A resilient system
needs all three potentials therefore a resilience metric
should consider them.
Cyber-physical systems are comprised of three different
domains that interact to provide a service [1], [7]: the
physical, the cyber and the control (or cyber-physical)
domain. In each domain, multiple measures of performance
are present. A resilience metric has to be flexible in
a way that allows the evaluation of resilience with re-
spect to all performance measures. Through interaction
the domains become dependent; a decreased performance
in one domain, is a potential challenge to performance
measures in other domains. An effective understanding
of the resilience of a system needs to consider these in-
terdependencies. At the same time, not all performance
measures are relevant for each evaluation. To make the
complexity manageable, a metric needs to be scalable;
aspects of the system that are irrelevant during evaluation
need to be abstracted. However, the metric framework
should in general be applicable to all potential perfor-
mance measures.
Table I presents current approaches with respect to the
seven attributes identified for an effective resilience metric.
It shows that there are a number of shortcomings where
significant factors such as time, the dependencies between
performance measures or resilience potentials are ignored
which leads to an incomplete view of resilience.
[8] [9] [7] [2] [3] [10]
Comparable   #    
Prediction    #   
Evaluate Measurements G#    # #
Resilience Potentials
Analysis
 #   #  
Flexibility #  # #   
Interdependencies # G#  #  #
Scalability    # G#  
Table I: Completeness of relevant resilience metrics for
cyber-physical systems. Full circle . . . requirement fulfilled.
Half-full circle . . . adaption possible to fulfill requirement.
Empty circle . . . requirement not considered.
Watson et al. [10] propose to measure resilience with
respect to probability and impact of adverse incidents.
In a similar but more concrete approach Chanda and
Srivastava [3] apply percolation theory to a topological
graph model of the system and use decision making to
quantify the results. However, probability and impact
based metrics are generally unable to consider the time
dimension of the recovery potential.
Rieger et al. [7] specifies a resilience metric based on
control loop performance. The metric is computed with
the use of game theoretic approaches. A similar approach
is taken by Melin et al. [8] with a mathematical definition
of resilience in closed-loop control systems. The problem
with the focus on control systems is the loss of flexibility,
as performance measures that are not control loop specific
cannot be considered.
In work by Henry et al. [9] resilience is defined as the
ratio between the initial system state before a disruptive
event occurs and the recovered state after a resilience
action was taken. This approach is very similar to the
approach taken in this work, however important concepts
like absorbing potential, or the time it takes to recover are
not considered.
III. Resilience Metric Framework
The performance of a system can be described by a
vector of all performance measures
~p(t) =

p1(t)
p2(t)
...
pn(t)
 (1)
where each performance measure pi(t) has a nominal
performance pNi – the performance in a challenge free
environment –, a collapse threshold pTi – a performance
level from which the system cannot recover on its own
– and is bound by 0 ≤ pi(t) ≤ pNi . Based on a single
performance measure pi(t) the resilience of the system
with respect to this performance measure is defined as Rpi
as given by Eq. 2.
Rpi : R+ → [0; 1] : t 7→ 1−
∫ t
t0
pi(τ)dτ − pTi · (t− t0)
(t− t0)(pNi − pTi )
(2)
It describes the ratio between the actual system perfor-
mance (the area between pi(t) and pTi ) and the worst
case system performance. This metric is supported by
a framework that models each performance measure pi
in dependence to other performance measures, as well
as external challenges. The quantitative results from the
metric can then be rooted in the complete system. The
framework can further be used to predict the resilience of
the system through estimation without applying real chal-
lenges at runtime. Each performance measure is modeled
as a differential equation which is solvable as an initial
value problem (IVP). where p(t0) = p0 (see Eq. 3).
p˙i(t) = [f(t, r, pi(t), pNi )− g(t,~c(t), ~p(t))] ·Θpi(pi(t)) (3)
Here, f represents the recovery potential of a degraded
system. It depends on the time t, a recovery rate r which
needs to be identified for each system and can be a
constant or a complex function, the current performance
pi(t) and the nominal performance pNi . On the other
hand, g represents the absorbing potential and depends
on the time, a set of external challenges ~c(t) and all
other performance measures. The dependence on other
measures is important as they can pose a challenge to the
measure in focus. Finally, Θpi(pi(t)) is a heaviside function
that describes the performance threshold pTi under which
the system is considered collapsed. (see [11] for further
details).
IV. Experimental Setup
A. Use Case Description
In recent work, microgrids are proposed in different
scenarios to increase grid resilience [5], [12]. One rarely
discussed problem with islanded operation of microgrids
is their reconnection to the main grid. Among other
difficulties the system needs to reliably prevent out-of-sync
reclosure. This happens if the difference in phase angle
between the microgrid and the main grid is too large and
can cause severe damage to power equipment. While the
general performance of these approaches was previously
evaluated, little research was done on the effects of cyber
attacks on these use cases. In this work, we evaluate
the resilience of synchronous islanding control which was
previously defined in Best et al. [13] to prevent out-of-
sync reclosure during denial of service attacks that intro-
duce network delay. Phasor measurement units (PMUs)
are deployed in the microgrid and the main grid. PMUs
periodically measure phase angle (Φ), frequency (ω) and
voltage magnitude (Xm). Based on the information from
the PMUs, a local controller in the microgrid aims to
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Figure 1: Challenges and performance measures with re-
spect to the system domains. Two external challenges
effect the physical and cyber domain; the control domain
is challenged internally by load changes and network delay.
Three performance measures from the control domain are
considered.
minimize the error between the two systems to guarantee
that reclosure is safe.
Synchronous islanding is subject to countless challenges.
In this work we will focus on step changes in load and
denial-of-service attacks that introduce network delay.
Figure 1 shows how the three system domains, the chal-
lenges of interest and relevant performance measures are
connected. This shows the flexibility and scalability of the
framework; unnecessary aspects are ignored but various
performance measures can be used to compute resilience.
B. System Model
The resilience metric is applied to a power island oper-
ated synchronized to an optimal main grid; the system is
modeled in Matlab/Simulink. The model is based around
a speed controlled synchronous generator rated at 550MW
and a frequency of 50Hz. The generator is subject to an
initial load of 250MW and an additional step-on load of
variable size. The frequency response of the system is
measured by a PMU simulation model based on work
by Roscoe et al. [14]. The simulation model presented
here utilizes the P Class PMU with a sampling rate of
10kHz which is compliant to the 2011 version of the IEEE
C37.118 standard and is available online1.
The synchronous generator is controlled by a PI-
controller that listens for the measurements from the
local (feedback) PMU and the remote (reference) PMU
to compute the current error in frequency and phase
between microgrid and main grid. The system is subject to
common challenges from IT networks like dropped packets,
jitter or network delay. These challenges will cause delayed
measurements and measurements that arrive out-of-order
1https://goo.gl/7z4uFM (last accessed 14/12/2016)
Step Frequency Phase
MW (%) tr (s) ζf e (Hz) tr (s) ζp e (rad)
10 (1.8) 0.9 0.3595 0.0760 1.94 0.125 0.5878
20 (3.6) 0.9 0.3571 0.1527 1.94 0.1252 1.1767
50 (9) 0.9 0.3509 0.3808 1.94 0.1317 2.9607
75 (13.6) 0.9 0.3467 0.5702 1.94 0.1607 pi
100 (18) 0.9 0.397 0.7588 1.94 0.1421 pi
125 (22.7) 0.9 0.371 0.9482 1.94 0.1537 pi
150 (27.3) 0.9 0.3491 1.1393 1.94 0.1488 pi
175 (31.8) 1 0.3301 1.3395 1.94 0.1329 pi
200 (36.4) 1 0.4126 1.5349 1.94 0.1757 pi
250 (45.5) 1 0.2894 1.9404 1.94 0.1278 pi
Table II: Evaluation results of system responses to step-on
loads of various size. The load steps are given in MW and
in percentage to the power rating of the generator. The
table shows the rise time tr, the damping factor ζ and the
maximum error e for frequency and phase. For the rise
time and the error, the unit is given in brackets.
or not at all. The controller design is based on work by
Best et al. [13] and improved to handle network challenges
by buffering measurements and computing a new set point
whenever a new pair of reference and feedback measure-
ments is available.
The simulation model was used to gather initial infor-
mation about the system performance. Table II shows the
impact of step changes on rise time tr and maximum error
e with respect to frequency and phase. Further, it shows
the parameter ζ that defines the asymptotes of the error
response to the challenge. All of these measurements will
be used to model the system as shown in the next section.
V. Evaluation Results
A. Metric Implementation
The performance of the system under evaluation can be
described as ~p(t) with
~p(t) =

pl(t)
pd(t)
pf (t)
pp(t)

where pl(t) is the load on the microgrid at time t, pd(t)
is the network delay, pf (t) is the error in frequency and
pp(t) is the error in phase angle. From these, pl and pd
are internal challenges to pf which in turn is a challenge
to pp; the difference in frequency between the two systems
causes the phase angle to shift. It is possible to abstract
the challenge that the cyber-attack imposes, as it is known
that only the effect of network delay is of interest (see
Fig. 1 in Sect. IV). Then, pl and pd can be seen as known
functions and don’t have to be modeled. The remaining
functions will be designed based on the results shown in
Tab. II in Sect. III. The measurements show that both, tr
and ζ are independent from the size of the step challenge.
In contrast there seems to be a linear relationship between
the step size and the maximum error. Thus, the absorption
potential of frequency and phase can be described by a
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Figure 2: Highlights how Eq. 4 - 6 estimate Rpp . The
first figure shows how the step change from L0 to LS is
estimated by a Eq. 4. For frequency and phase error the
real measurements are shown and how they are estimated.
Here E0 are the nominal performances and EA are the
acceptable performances (threshold for settling time). FET
is the threshold that needs to be passed for the phase to
recover. PEmax is the maximum phase error.
constant factor. The recovery potential can be estimated
by the asymptotes of the oscillating control response;
they are defined by ζ which is in turn linearly related to
the network delay (not shown in Tab. II). Equation 4 -
7 form the system model for the resilience metric. The
performance measures pf (t) and pp(t) are estimated as a
differential equation in the form of Eq. 3. Step changes
(like changes in load) need to be estimated to make them
integrable; as estimation a logistic function is chosen (see
Eq. 4).
pl(t) =
L
1 + e−k·(t−(t0−tr/2)) (4)
p˙f (t) =
(
(FE0 − pf (t)) · ζf · eζf ·(FE0−pf (t))
)
−
(
kf · p˙l(t)
)
(5)
p˙p(t) =
(
−pp(t)·ζp ·eζp·(−pp(t))
)
·ΘFET (pf (t))−
(
kp ·p˙l(t)
)
(6)
ζ = r · pd(t) + d (7)
The generic function of ζ is given by Eq. 7 where simu-
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Figure 3: System resilience under different challenges.
lation results suggest that rf = −0.003671, df = 0.3553,
rp = −0.00217 and dp = 0.17. Further, kf and kp describe
the constant relationship between the maximum perfor-
mance decrease and the step challenge. Finally, ΘFET is a
heaviside function that is 0 if pf (t) < FET and 1 otherwise.
This highlights that the phase angle can only recover if the
frequency error is within certain limits. The phase error
cannot grow indefinitely but instead stays within [−pi, pi]
rad. As long as pf is not in a certain range (until tp),
no assumptions can be made about the phase error so
the worst case has to be assumed which is ±pi. Figure 2
highlights how the system resilience with respect to phase
error (Rpp) under step changes in load is estimated.
B. System Analysis
Based on the system model, the resilience can now be
estimated and computed from measurements. Figure 3
shows the estimated resilience with respect to different
load steps and network delays. In Fig. 3a the resilience
metric is applied independently for each challenge situ-
ation (LS and pt). The resilience estimation (the area
in red in Fig. 2) is computed from t0 to ts where ts
changes for each challenge and evaluation. The results
show that for 10MW ≤ LS ≤ 30MW the absorbing
potential ensures that pf < FET . As tp = tr = 1s, the
resilience decreases proportional to the change of the load
step. For greater load changes, the resilience stays fairly
constant and equal for all constant network delays. The
results show that constant challenges to the system do not
affect the resilience if the metric is applied in this way.
This is an important finding as it shows that constant
challenges can be ignored when different grid installations
or algorithms are compared; this simplifies the system
models needed. However, if the challenge is not constant
(see the case where the network delay changes for 15s
during the recovery), then the results cannot be compared.
The computed resilience drops if the delay is changing over
time.
The reason is that the settling time ts is changed with
each evaluation. Challenged by a cyber attack, the network
delay will not be constant. The estimation is computed
for a shorter time span; however the amount of time in
relatively bad performance is longer which leads to a lower
resilience. To compare the resilience of different dynamic
challenges to the same system, the time over which the
integral is taken needs to stay constant. This is done in
Fig. 3b where the integral is computed from t0 to max(ts).
The results show that network delay has a big impact on
system performance and thus resilience.
To analyse the survivability of the system with respect
to network delay, ζf and ζp need to be analysed. Equation
6 shows that the recovery potential of pp is dependent on
ζp and pf . The recovery potential of pf depends solely
on ζf . So to ensure survivability it needs to be ensured
that both, ζf and ζp are greater than 0. Otherwise, the
recovery potential would be 0 or negative which would
lead to a further increase in error. By transforming Eq. 7
the threshold for a positive recovery rate can be computed
with 96ms for pf and 78ms for pp.
Finally, Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 can be used to identify the
most efficient changes to the system to increase resilience.
There are two controlling factors for pf in response to
load challenges. First, kf defines the absorbing potential,
second ζf defines the recovery potential; both depend on
the control implementation. Since load changes are normal
operation and can hardly be limited, an improvement
of the resilience can only be achieved by improvements
to the control design. However, network delay also has
a significant impact on performance if the system is
already challenged by load changes. This is something
that is harder to address with the control design. While
control improvements can also increase the resilience to
network delay, there is only so much the controller can
do as measurements are invalidated by new readings every
100ms (see PMU report rate). Thus, it is necessary to limit
network delays in the cyber domain rather than the control
domain to effectively increase the resilience. Further, im-
provements to the recovery potential are more promising
in the presented system than changes to the absorbing
potential as they improve the resilience with respect to
both considered challenges. The absorbing potential is not
affected by the network delay.
VI. Conclusion
This work presented a descriptive resilience metric
framework for smart grids. Seven attributes of a effective
metric were extracted from relevant definitions of resilience
in the domain and it was discussed how metrics proposed
previously fail to fulfill expectations. The results presented
in this work suggest that the proposed metric framework
can offer a more complete approach to evaluate resilience.
The strongest contributions are the ability to analyse
resilience with respect to various performance measures
(flexibility) while the relationships between the system
domains are considered; the two attributes most often left
out by existing approaches. Future work will aim to apply
the metric to a distribution network use case to allow a
more direct comparison to other metrics.
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